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EMPIRICAL RELEVANCE OF AMBIGUITY IN FIRST PRICE
AUCTION MODELS∗
GAURAB ARYAL† AND DONG-HYUK KIM‡
Abstract. We study the identification and estimation of first-price auction
models where bidders have ambiguity about the valuation distribution and
their preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility. When entry
is exogenous, the distribution and ambiguity structure are nonparametri-
cally identified, separately from risk aversion (CRRA). We propose a flexible
Bayesian method based on Bernstein polynomials. Monte Carlo experiments
show that our method estimates parameters precisely, and chooses reserve
prices with (nearly) optimal revenues, whether there is ambiguity or not.
Furthermore, if the model is misspecified – incorrectly assuming no ambigu-
ity among bidders – it may induce estimation bias with a substantial revenue
loss.
Keywords: first-price auction, identification, ambiguity aversion, maxmin
expected utility, Bayesian estimation
JEL classification: C11, C44, D44
1. Introduction
We study the identification and estimation of first-price auction models with
independent private values where symmetric risk averse bidders do not know
the valuation distribution, i.e., the distribution is ambiguous. In particular,
we depart from the current literature on empirical auctions by relaxing the as-
sumption that there is a unique valuation distribution that is commonly known
among the bidders. Instead, we consider an environment where the bidders
regard many distributions as equally reasonable. The main contribution of the
paper is three-fold. First, we introduce the maximin expected utility model with
multiple distributions, (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), to capture the presence
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of ambiguity in empirical auctions.1 Second, we provide sufficient conditions to
nonparametrically identify the valuation distribution and the bidders’ attitude
toward ambiguity separately from their risk (CRRA) preference. Third, we de-
velop a Bayesian method that employs Bernstein polynomials to estimate the
model parameters and propose policy recommendations.
Almost all papers in empirical auction use the expected utility (EU) frame-
work. See Donald and Paarsch (1993); Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000);
Athey and Haile (2007); Hendricks and Porter (2007); Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2009) among others. Under this framework, bidders know the valuation distri-
bution, while the econometrician does not. Recently, research in decision theory
and experimental economics, Gilboa (2009); Camerer and Karjalainen (1994);
Fox and Tversky (1995); Halevy (2007) have convincingly illustrated that in
many situations economic agents might not be “probabilistically sophisticated”
and unable to pin-point the exact distribution. In such environments, it is
conceivable that both the bidders and econometrician are uncertain about the
distribution.2 How can such uncertainties be introduced in empirical auction?
Are such models identified? Can we use bids data to determine whether bid-
ders are uncertain about the true distribution? We provide answers to these
questions.
To model bidders’ uncertainty about the distribution we consider an environ-
ment with multiple distributions: where bidders have a set of infinitely many,
equally reasonable, distributions. This leads to decisions under ambiguity. Am-
biguity in probability judgements has been studied since Keynes (1921); Knight
(1921), culminating to a position of eminence with Ellsberg (1961). More re-
cently decision under ambiguity has become an influential subfield of economics;
see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); Epstein (1999); Hansen and Sargent (2001)
and Gilboa (2009) for a comprehensive treatment. It is crucial for the seller to
determine the presence of ambiguity from auction data and draw an optimal
policy under ambiguity for the following reasons: First, ambiguity nests EU
as a special case and hence leads to more robust analysis of the data. Sec-
ond, if bidders are ambiguity averse the revenue equivalence fails, Lo (1998).
Third, first price auction is suboptimal and the optimal reserve price should
1 An ambiguity averse decision maker prefers a lottery with a known distribution to the
one with an unknown distribution.
2 Hansen (2014) refers to them as economic models with outside uncertainty and in-
side uncertainty, respectively and articulates the need and benefits of allowing both such
uncertainties.
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decrease with ambiguity, Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape (2006); Bose and Renou
(2014); Bodoh-Creed (2012). Thus this paper contributes to the empirical auc-
tion literature by providing a tractable framework to introduce and estimate a
model with ambiguity aversion.
We follow (Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape, 2006) and assume that bidders have
the maxmin expected utility (henceforth, MEU) which also provides a natural
generalization of EU. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) laid a formal foundation
for MEU and showed that under some axioms there is a set Γ of equally rea-
sonable distributions and each bidder maximizes the expected utility, where the
expectation is taken with respect to the most pessimistic distribution in Γ. The
theory, however, is silent about Γ, so it has to be specified by the econome-
trician. A strong parametrization of Γ, however, may cause a misspecification
bias or can even nullify any effect of ambiguity; see Example 1. So we only
assume that Γ is a convex subset of all absolutely continuous distributions over
a compact support, each with nowhere vanishing density. This specification is
sufficiently flexible enough to minimize misspecification bias and at the same
time allows us to consider the kind of ambiguity that has meaningful empirical
content. The set Γ is assumed to include the true distribution. In each auc-
tion bidders independently and privately draw their valuations (IPV) from this
common, but unknown, (true) distribution. Thus we consider static first price
auctions with symmetric players. Since ambiguity in empirical auction is a new
topic, focusing on static auction will allow for meaningful analysis of ambiguity
as it keeps the model tractable by allowing us to abstract away from model-
ing forward looking and learning behavior with multiple distributions in a dy-
namic game; see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993); Epstein and Schneider (2003);
Siniscalchi (2011).
A maxmin bidder uses the most pessimistic distribution to determine her bid.
To model this pessimism we innovate a mapping, and call it the D-function,
that assigns each quantile of the true distribution to a quantile of the most
pessimistic distribution so that whenever there is ambiguity the D-function is
(strictly) below the identity in the interior of the unit interval. The model prim-
itives to identify are then the valuation distribution, the D-function, and the
utility function. We assume that bid data are generated from the symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game with incomplete information in
which every bidder computes her winning probability using the most pessimistic
distribution. The BNE is characterized by a unique, strictly increasing, bidding
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strategy (Maskin and Riley, 1984; Athey, 2001), which is useful for identifica-
tion. (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2009) showed that the model even without
ambiguity is unidentified, and they identified the model additionally assuming
that bidders’ participation is exogenous. Even under this restriction, however,
we find that the MEU model is observationally equivalent to the EU model. So,
we need more structure to identify the model primitives from bid data. To that
end, we assume that the utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
Under these assumptions, we establish the identification of the model primitives.
Specifically, the slope of the bidding strategy at the lowest value depends on the
utility function only, which isolates the CRRA coefficient. Then, the difference
in bid quantiles across auctions with different numbers of bidders identifies the
D-function. Finally, the strict monotonicity of the bidding strategy, which is
a functional of the D-function and the utility function, uncovers the valuation
distribution from the bid distributions. We acknowledge that (Grundl and Zhu,
2013) simultaneously and independently obtained similar identification results,
but our paper differs substantially in terms of estimation and analysis.
We propose a Bayesian method to estimate the model primitives and choose
a revenue maximizing reserve price. We directly specify the valuation density
and the D-function using a mixture of Bernstein polynomials. Bernstein poly-
nomials form a dense subset in the space of functions with a bounded support.
The direct approach provides a natural environment for the Bayesian decision
rule to choose a reserve price, (Aryal and Kim, 2013; Kim, 2013), and it al-
lows us to impose shape restrictions implied by the theoretical model, such as
monotonicity of the bidding function and D-function below the identity func-
tion, with ease. As a result our empirical method is always in sync with the
theoretical model, which not only improves efficiency but also leads to valid
policy recommendations; see (Kim, 2014). Another advantage of the Bayesian
method arises when we assume ambiguity, and restrict the D-function to be
below the identity function, but bidders know the true distribution, so the D-
function is an identity function. This might then lead to a bias because the true
D-function is the boundary of the space of all D-functions while we restrict it
below the boundary. We can reduce this bias by putting a positive prior mass
on the boundary. This prior mass then enables the data (likelihood) to increase
the probability on the true D on the boundary, and as a result, improves the
accuracy of posterior prediction. Such a bias reduction procedure would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, in a frequentist framework. Moreover, the support of
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the bid data depends on the model primitives, in which case, unlike the MLE,
the Bayesian method continues to be efficient; see (Hirano and Porter, 2003).
We document the performance of our method in a Monte Carlo study. We
consider three different environments, each with a number of alternative data
configurations by varying sample sizes and the numbers of bidders. In the first
(second) environment, bid data are generated from the model with (without)
ambiguity. In both cases, our method precisely estimates the model primitives
and chooses reserve prices that produce nearly the largest revenues for all the
configurations under consideration. It is noticeable that even when there is no
ambiguity our method performs well. This is not only because MEU nests EU
but also because in our method we can put a prior mass on the boundary of
the space of D-functions. Lastly to understand the effect of ignoring ambiguity
we consider an environment where bid data are generated from the model with
ambiguity but the econometrician ignores ambiguity. We find that then the
estimates are inaccurate – the mean integrated squared errors of the estimated
valuation densities are roughly four to twenty times larger than the case of the
first environment. This misspecification leads to about three percent lower rev-
enues than the first environment above. To summarize: our method performs
well whether there is ambiguity or not, but if we incorrectly ignore ambigu-
ity, the estimates can be severely biased and policy recommendations may be
unreliable.
In the remaining of the paper we proceed as follows. We start with the model
and identification in section 2, estimation methodology in section 3, the Monte
Carlo study in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2. Model And Identification
An indivisible object is to be allocated to one of n ≥ 2 bidders in a first-price
auction without a positive reserve price. Each bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} observes
only her own value vi and bids bi. The highest bidder wins the object and gets
utility u(vi − bi) while the rest get u(0). A bidder i with value vi solves:
max
bi
{u(vi − bi)× Pr(win)} ≡ max
bi
{u(vi − bi)× Pr(bi ≥ bj , j 6= i)} . (1)
The values v1, . . . , vn are all independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) from
F0(·|n,W ), defined over [v(n,W ), v(n,W )], where, W ∈ W ⊂ R
L is a vector of
auction covariates that is observed by both the bidders and the econometrician.
For notational ease, we shall suppress the dependence on W . Bidders, however,
do not know F0(·|n), and they cannot compute the “winning probability,” which
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is essential to solve (1) under the EU framework. To model the bidders’ bidding
behavior, therefore, we follow the literature on decision under ambiguity and
assume:
Assumption 1. Bidders are ambiguity averse and their preferences have maxmin
expected utility representation.
If Ω denotes the set of all possible states of nature, u˜(·) the utility function,
and A the set of all feasible actions, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provides
necessary and sufficient behavioral conditions such that there is a unique convex
set Γ of equally reasonable distributions over Ω such that a decision maker
prefers an action a to b with a, b ∈ A whenever
min
F∈Γ
{EF u˜(a(ω))} ≥ min
F∈Γ
{EF u˜(b(ω))} ,
where EF is the expectation with respect to the probability measure F and ω ∈
Ω. Furthermore, for empirical implementation, it is desirable that the set Γ con-
tains countably additive distributions. To that end, we follow Chateauneuf, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Tallon
(2005) and assume that the preference ordering is monotone continuous.
We begin by proposing a way to adapt the set of distributions to represent
the strategic effects of ambiguity. Let Pn be a set of all distribution functions
defined over [v(n), v(n)] for a given n ∈ N := {m ∈ N : 2 ≤ m <∞}, such that
F0(·|n) ∈ Pn. In addition, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. It is common knowledge among the bidders that:
(1) There are n ∈ N bidders with an identical utility function u : R+ → R+
with u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0, and u(0) = 0.
(2) Their values v1, . . . , vn are independently and identically distributed.
(3) The true valuation distribution F0(·|n) ∈ Pn is unknown to the bidders,
but any information about F0(·|n) other than realized values is shared
among the bidders.
The first two parts of the assumptions are self explanatory. The last part implies
that bidders have access to a common training data that is used to form their
beliefs. For instance, in the timber auction every bidder “cruises” the same
tract before bidding.
Following the tradition of Harsanyi (1967), we interpret the auction as a
game of incomplete information among the bidders with an identical informa-
tion structure. From assumptions 1 and 2, this implies that every bidder uses
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the most pessimistic distribution in the set Γ of equally reasonable distribu-
tions to determine her expected utility and chooses a bid accordingly. Since
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is silent about what the set Γ should be, in prac-
tice an econometrician has to choose the set. The choice will affect the esti-
mation and inference. To illustrate the importance of choosing Γ we consider
a widely used model (in statistics and economics), called the ε-contamination
model,3 where Γ is the set of all distributions that can be written as a (1 − ε)
and (ε) combination of the true distribution F0(·|n) and some other distribution
R(·|n), and show that such a parametrization neutralizes any strategic effects
arising due to ambiguity.
Example 1. (ε− contamination) Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be commonly known to n
bidders. Under the ε-contaminated model, the set of distributions is defined as
Γ˜n(ε) := {F (·|n) : F (·|n) = (1− ε)F0(·|n) + εR(·|n) with R(·|n) ∈ Pn},
which is unknown to the econometrician. Even though the bidders know ε they
do not know F0(·|n). Let βn : [v(n), v(n)]→ R be a strictly increasing bidding
function. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, then, the objective function (1) can be
written as
max
x∈[v(n),v(n)]
min
F∈Γ˜n(ε)
u(v − βn(x))F (x|n)
n−1 = max
x∈[v(n),v(n)]
u(v − βn(x))F
∗(x|n)n−1
where F ∗(v|n) = (1 − ε)F0(v|n) · 1[v < v(n)] + 1[v = v(n)], with 1(A) an
indicator for the event A. We reserve the notation F ∗(·|·) to denote the most
pessimistic distribution. The solution to the MEU model with Γ˜n(ε) also solves
the EU model, since
arg max
x∈[v(n),v(n)]
u(v−βn(x)) [(1− ε)F0(x|n)]
n−1 = arg max
x∈[v(n),v(n)]
u(v−βn(x))F0(x|n)
n−1.
Intuitively, this transpires because the ambiguity, as measured by ε, scales the
true distribution for all the bidders by a factor of (1 − ε), and hence does not
affect the relative probability of winning. In this model, the first order condition
(FOC) is
u′[v − βn(v)]β
′
n(v)
u[v − βn(v)](n− 1)
=
f ∗(v|n)
F ∗(v|n)
=
(1− ε)f0(v|n)
(1− ε)F0(v|n)
=
f0(v|n)
F0(v|n)
, (2)
suggesting that even if there is ambiguity about F0(·|n), as long as her in-
verse hazard rate is unaffected, such ambiguity is strategically irrelevant. This
3 See Huber (1973); Berger (1985); Berger and Berliner (1986); Nishimura and Ozaki
(2004); Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2013) for usage of ε-
contamination model.
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conclusion holds for any other parametrization of the set, not just for the ε-
contaminated model.
Therefore we ought be careful as to how we specify the set Γn. Instead of
parametrizing Γn, we only assume that Γn ⊂ Pn is a weakly compact and
convex neighborhood around F0(·|n), which is sufficient to guarantee that a
unique absolutely continuous least-favorable distribution (and density) exists.
Assumption 3. For all n ∈ N , it is common knowledge among bidders that
the set Γn ⊂ Pn forms a weakly compact and convex neighborhood of strictly
increasing and continuously differentiable distributions around F0(·|n), such that
F ∗(·|n) ∈ Γn, F
∗(v|n) ≤ F (v|n) for all F (·|n) ∈ Γn and has a density f
∗(·|n) >
0, a.e.
Under Assumptions 1 – 3, each bidder chooses a bid to maximize her expected
utility with respect to F ∗(·|n) in Γn such that F
∗(v|n) ≤ F (v|n) for all v ∈
[v(n), v(n)] and for all F (v|n) ∈ Γn. Assumption 3 guarantees that F
∗(·|n) ∈
Γn and it is unique. The assumption implies that all distributions in Γn are
mutually absolutely continuous with the common support, [v(n), v(n)]. (Hence,
the ε-contamination in Example 1 is excluded.) Moreover, since only the lower
envelop F ∗(v|n) is common knowledge, not the entire set Γn, we implicitly allow
bidders to have asymmetric beliefs, i.e., Γn,i for each i = 1, . . . , n, as long as
each set, Γn,i, has the identical lower envelop, F
∗(v|n).
We focus only on a symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In
particular, every bidder conjectures that her opponents use a strictly increas-
ing (pure) bidding strategy, and announces a bid that is a best response to
that conjecture and at the equilibrium the conjecture turns out to be true.
Once we recognize F ∗(·|n) plays the same role under MEU as F0(·|n) under
EU, the existence of a unique, symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium char-
acterized by a strictly increasing βn(·) follows from Maskin and Riley (1984);
Athey (2001). This bidding strategy maps the latent value to the observed bid.
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) showed that when bidders are risk neutral,
this map can be inverted to link each bid to a unique value, thereby identifying
F0(·|n). Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009); Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2011) extended this result to allow for risk averse bidders. Now, we extend
these results to the MEU representation.
Let D : [0, 1] → [0, 1] solve the min part of the bidder’s objective, such that
D [F0(v|n)] := F
∗(v|n) = minF∈Γn F (v|n), ∀v ∈ [v(n), v(n)]. Equivalently, for
AMBIGUITY IN FIRST PRICE AUCTION 9
all γ ∈ [0, 1]
D(γ) := F ∗
[
F−10 (γ|n)
∣∣∣n] , (3)
and hence it maps the true probability F0(·|n) to the most pessimistic one
F ∗(·|n). So, D(γ) ≤ γ and D′(0) > 0. Whenever there is ambiguity, D(γ)
would be less than γ for all γ ∈ (0, 1) so that the distance of D(·) from the 45◦
line measures the extent of ambiguity. When all (n− 1) bidders follow βn(·), a
bidder with value v solves:
max
x∈R+
min
F∈Γn
{
u [v − βn(x)]F (x|n)
n−1
}
= max
x∈R+
{
u [v − βn(x)]D [F0(x|n)]
n−1} .
The first-order condition with respect to x, when evaluated at x = v gives
−u′ [v − βn(x)] β
′
n(x)D [F0(x|n)] + u [v − βn(x)] (n− 1)D
′ [F0(x|n)] f0(x|n) = 0.
Rearranging the terms gives a differential equation that characterizes the opti-
mal bidding strategy as:
u [v − βn(v)]
u′ [v − βn(v)]
=
D [F0(v|n)]
D′ [F0(v|n)]
[
1
(n− 1)f0(v|n)/β ′n(v)
]
. (4)
Lemma 1. Let λ(x) := u(x)/u′(x) for x ∈ R. For all v ∈ (v(n), v(n)] the equi-
librium bidding strategy for risk averse bidders satisfies the differential equation
(4), βn(v(n)) = v(n) and β
′
n(v(n)) =
(n−1)λ′(0)
(n−1)λ′(0)+1
.
The first part of the lemma means bidder with lowest value will bid her true
value, Maskin and Riley (1984), while the second part of the lemma shows
that the slope of bidding strategy at the lower boundary is independent of the
distribution, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009).
Let H(γ) := D(γ)/D′(γ) for γ ∈ [0, 1], or alternatively
H(γ) = F ∗
[
F−10 (γ|n)
∣∣∣n] f0
[
F−10 (γ|n)
∣∣∣n]
f ∗
[
F−10 (γ|n)
∣∣∣n] .
Substituting λ(·) and H(·) in the FOC (4) gives
λ [v − βn(v)] =
H [F0(v|n)]
(n− 1)f0(v|n)/β ′n(v)
. (5)
Before addressing the problem of identification, we define the observables. Let
G(·|n) be the distribution of equilibrium bid b := βn(v) for v ∼ F0(·|n), i.e.,
G(b|n) = F0[β
−1(b)|n] and its density is
g(b|n) :=
f0[β
−1(b)|n]
β ′n[β
−1
n (b)]
.
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Let vγ and bγ be the γ-th quantile of the value and the equilibrium bid. Since
γ = F0(vγ|n) = G[βn(vγ)|n] = G(bγ |n), for every quantile γ ∈ [0, 1], (5) becomes
λ(vγ − bγ) =
H(γ)
(n− 1)g(bγ|n)
. (6)
Under the i.i.d. assumption, g(·|n) is nonparametrically identified from the bid
data, but the model primitives are not in general identified without additional
assumptions, including the ones on the set Γn :
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1 - 3, the valuation distribution F0(·|n) is
not identified by the knowledge of the bid distribution, i.e., G(·|n).
Proof. Let [U(x) = x, F ≡ U(0, 1)] and D(γ) = (exp(2γ) − 1)/(exp(2) − 1) be
the model. Then the equilibrium bidding strategy is given by
βn(v) = v −
∫ v
0
(
F ∗(t)
F ∗(v)
)n−1
dt = v −
∫ v
0
(
D(F (t))
D(F (v))
)n−1
dt = v −
∫ v
0
(
exp(2t)− 1
exp(2v)− 1)
)n−1
dt.
Consider another model with risk neutral bidders, D˜(γ) = (exp(γ)−1)/(exp(1)−
1) and some a new CDF F˜ (·) 6= F (·) (to be determined shortly below). Then
the equilibrium bidding strategy is given by
β˜n(v) = v −
∫ v
0
(
D˜(F˜ (t))
D˜(F˜ (v))
)n−1
dt = v −
∫ v
0
(
exp(F˜ (t))− 1
exp(F˜ (v))− 1
)n−1
dt.
The two models are observationally equivalent if
F˜ (v) = ln
(
1 + (exp(2v)− 1)
exp(1)− 1
exp(2)− 1
)

In view of this result, we consider auctions with exogenous participation.
Assumption 4. Exogenous Participation: ∀n ∈ N,Γn = Γ and F0(·|n) =
F0(·).
4
Assumption 4 has been used in the literature by Athey and Haile (2002); Bajari and Hortac¸su
(2005); Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009); Aradillas-Lopez, Gandhi, and Quint
(2013) among others. It is equivalent to assuming that there is some n′ potential
bidders with values (v1, . . . , vn′) out of which a random subset of n ≤ n
′ bidders
participate in a given auction. This identifying assumption is appropriate for
the experiment data where the number of bidders are exogenously chosen by the
4 So the set Pn is the same for all n ∈ N and because Γ will also be the same, so will F
∗(·)
be .
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experimenter. When the utility function is unspecified, however, this exclusion
restriction is still insufficient for identification.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1–4, the model structure [u(·), F0(·)] is not
nonparametrically identified by G(·|n1) and G(·|n2) with n1 < n2.
Proof. We begin by stating (without a proof) the rationalizability lemma from
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), adapted to our setting.
Lemma 2. Let Gj(·|nj) be the joint distribution of (b
j
1, b
j
2, . . . , b
j
nj
), conditional
on nj for j = 1, 2. There is an IPV auction model with maxmin expected utility,
i.e., [u(·), F0(·)], that rationalizes both G1(·|n1) and G2(·|n2) if and only if the
following conditions hold:
(1) Gj(b
j
1, . . . , b
j
nj
|nj) =
∏nj
i=1Gj(b
j
i |nj), where Gj(·|nj) is the bid distribu-
tion form auction with nj bidders.
(2) ∃λ : R+ → R+ and ∃H : [0, 1]→ R+ such that λ(0) = 0, H(0) = 0, H(·)
is continuously differentiable and λ′(·) ≥ 1 such that ξ′(·) > 0 on [b, b]
where ξ(b, u, G, n,H) is such that:
(a) ξ(bj , u, Gj, nj , H) := b
j + λ−1
[
H(Gj(bj |nj))
(nj−1)gj(bj |nj)
]
, j = 1, 2.
(b) For each quantile γ ∈ [0, 1], b1γ+λ
−1
[
H(γ)
(n1−1)g(b1γ |n1)
]
= b2γ+λ
−1
[
H(γ)
(n2−1)g(b2γ |n2)
]
.
Then, we can identify λ−1(·) by following Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009).5
Let [F (·), λ(·), H(γ) := γ] and [F˜ (·), λ(·), H˜(γ) := ι+ γ], with ι ∈ (0, 1) be two
model structures, and F˜ (·) be the distribution of v˜ defined as follows: for every
quantile γ ∈ (0, 1] compute v(γ) = F−1(γ) and determine bjγ = β[vγ , F (·), nj, H ]
and
v˜γ = b
j
γ + λ
−1
[
ι+ γ
(nj − 1)gj(b
j
γ |nj)
]
.
Since the two model structures satisfy condition 2-b of Lemma 2, they both
rationalize the same data and hence, are observationally equivalent. 
This result is important because it shows that MEU and EU are observation-
ally equivalent even under exogenous variation of the number of bidders. This
equivalence is not because we use MEU. For instance, consider the multiplier
preference of Hansen and Sargent (2001) as an alternative to MEU. There, it
can be shown that this model with ambiguity is equivalent to a model where
5 λ(·) is invertible because λ′(·) ≥ 1.
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bidders are more risk averse but do not have any ambiguity.6 Moreover, without
ambiguity the model structure [u(·), F0(·)] is just-identified by the knowledge of
G(·|n1) and G(·|n2) with n1 6= n2, and with ambiguity we have to identify an
extra parameter, the ambiguity-function D(·). In view of this result, we restrict
ourselves to CRRA family, which is also the most widely used in the empirical
literature.
Assumption 5. The utility function is CRRA, i.e., u(w) = w
1−θ
1−θ
, θ ∈ [0, 1).
Thus we impose a parametric functional form for risk aversion and treat
ambiguity aversion nonparametrically. Whether or not this way of prioritizing
the estimation task is the right way depends on the effect of risk aversion that
cannot be captured by CRRA utility. For that we would need to estimate
a model of nonparametric utility and nonparametric ambiguity, but the only
paper that estimates risk aversion nonparametrically is Lu and Perrigne (2008)
and find that CRRA utility partly captures the nonparametric utility. This
provides some justification for our priority of ambiguity over risk aversion.7
Then under assumption 5, λ(w) = w
1−θ
when θ ∈ [0, 1). As propositions 1
and 2 argue, the model is not identified without the exclusion restriction, As-
sumption 4. This is true even with the parametrized utility functions. We now
formally establish the identification of the model primitives with the exclusion
restriction, under CRRA.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1 – 5, the model structures, i.e., [F0(·), D(·), θ],
are identified by G(·|n1) and G(·|n2) with n1 < n2.
Proof. We identify the risk aversion parameter and then identify the valuation
distribution. Using β ′n(v) = f0(v|n)/g(βn(v)|n) for n = n1 and n2 we get
β ′n1(v)
β ′n2(v)
=
f0(v|n1)
g(βn1(v)|n1)
×
g(βn2(v)|n2)
f0(v|n2)
=
g(βn2(v)|n2)
g(βn1(v)|n1)
,
where the second equality followed from assumption 4, i.e. f0(v|n) = f0(v).
Evaluating the above equation at the lower boundary v = v, and using λ′(0) =
6 The proof of this equivalence uses results from Strzalecki (2011) and Dupuis and Ellis
(1997), and is available upon request.
7 This also suggests that, like in Lu and Perrigne (2008); Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011),
if we have exogenous variation in auction formats and there is exclusion restriction we might
be able to identify both the utility and ambiguity nonparametrically. We do not pursue this
line of enquiry because such data are very rare. For estimating nonparametric utility is see
Kim (2015).
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1
1−θ
(assumption 5) in Lemma 1, i.e. β ′n(v) = (n− 1)/(n− θ), gives
(n1 − 1)(n2 − θ)
(n1 − θ)(n2 − 1)
=
β ′n1(v)
β ′n2(v)
=
g(b2|n2)
g(b1|n1)
,
and thus identifying θ as
θ =
n2(n1 − 1)g(b
2|n2)− n1(n2 − 1)g(b
1|n1)
(n1 − 1)g(b
2|n2)− (n2 − 1)g(b
1|n1)
. (7)
Then using λ−1(y) = (1− θ)y in (6), we get
v − b = λ−1
{
H [G(b|n)]
(n− 1)g(b|n)
}
= (1− θ)
{
H [G(b|n)]
(n− 1)g(b|n)
}
For each quantile γ ∈ [0, 1], let vγ ∈ [v, v] such that F0(vγ) = γ, and b
j
γ :=
βnj (vγ). Then, since G(b
j
γ |nj) = G[βnj (vγ)|nj ] = F0(vγ) = γ, for each γ ∈ [0, 1],
we have
vγ = b
j
γ +
(1− θ)H(γ)
(nj − 1)g(b
j
γ|nj)
. (8)
where j ∈ {1, 2}. Equating the quantiles for v under two auctions, we identify
H(γ) =
b2γ − b
1
γ
1− θ
[
1
(n1 − 1)g(b1γ|n1)
−
1
(n2 − 1)g(b2γ|n2)
]−1
,
D(γ) = exp
[
−
∫ 1
γ
1
H(t)
dt
]
.
Once D(·) is identified, F0(·) can be identified from equation (8). 
The bid distributions are directly identified by the observed bid data and the
CRRA parameter θ is identified by the lowest bidder’s bidding behavior. Af-
ter controlling for the effect of risk aversion, any deviation from the EU model
explains bidders’ attitude toward ambiguity, identifying D, from which the iden-
tification of F0 follows. An immediate corollary is the identification with risk
neutral bidders, which is the case of θ = 0.
3. Estimation Methodology
In this section, we propose a flexible Bayesian method to estimate the model
primitives – the valuation distribution, the D-function, and the risk aversion
coefficient – and propose policy recommendations. We first specify the model
primitives and explain our econometric procedure by applying it to simulated
data.
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Figure 1. Basis Functions of the Bernstein Polynomial Density
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Figure 2. *
Panels (a)–(c) show the basis functions for the Bernstein Polynomial Densities with 3,4 and
6 components, respectively.
3.1. Specification of Model Primitives. We specify the model primitives
directly to obtain the posterior distribution by evaluating the likelihood at each
proposed parameters. Thus the estimation method is similar to Kim (2014) and
different from the indirect approach of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000).
First, we model the valuation density with the support normalized to be [0, 1),
using a Bernstein polynomial density (henceforth, BPD)
f(v|θfk) :=
k∑
j=1
θfj,kφj,k(v), (9)
where k ∈ N\{0, 1}, φj,k(·) is the Beta density with parameters j and k−j+1,
and θfk ∈ ∆k−1 := {θ
f
k ∈ R
k
+ :
∑k
j=1 θ
f
j,k = 1}, a k − 1 dimensional unit simplex.
As seen in Figure 1, {φj,k}
′s are general and flexible. Since BPD is a mixture
of the k-many Beta densities, as k increases the set of BPD in Equation (9)
forms a dense subset in the space of continuous densities with [0, 1] support.
Therefore our specification is flexible enough to represent almost any density for
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suitably large k. Petrone (1999a,b) relied on this property of BPD to develop
a nonparametric Bayesian estimation method.
Next, we specify the D-function. Observe that, in Figure 1, only φ1,k in the
sequence {φj,k}
k
j=1 is strictly positive at 0 and only φk,k is strictly positive at 1.
So, if the coefficients for φ1,k and φk,k are zero, then the BPD in (9) is zero at
0 and 1. Using this property, we specify the D-function as:
D(γ|θDk ) := γ − θ
D
0
[
k−1∑
j=2
θDj,kφj,k(γ)
]
1(θD0 > 0), (10)
where θDk := (θ
D
0 , θ
D
2,k, . . . , θ
D
k−1,k) ∈ R×∆k−3 and 1(·) is the indicator function.
The second term in (10), after the negative sign, is equal to zero at 0 and
1, and it is bounded as it is proportional to the BPD. Therefore, D(γ|θDk ) in
(10) passes through (0, 0) and (1, 1) and always bounded from above by the
45◦ line. When D(·) is equal to the 45◦ line, there is no distortion and hence,
no ambiguity. This specification is useful to determine ambiguity because the
presence of ambiguity is completely represented by one parameter θD0 . We
would conclude that the bidders are ambiguity averse (respectively, neutral) if
the posterior probability of the event {θD0 ≤ 0} is less (respectively, greater)
than the posterior probability of {θD0 > 0}.
8
When there is no ambiguity, the estimate of the D function will be down-
wardly biased, irrespective of the estimation method, because we have to im-
pose D(γ) ≤ γ constraint. This is a well known problem, Andrews (1999), that
arises when the parameter is on the boundary of the parameter space. Under
the Bayesian method, we can reduce the bias by putting a positive prior mass
on {θD0 ≤ 0}, because then the posterior probability of no ambiguity will exceed
the prior probability, if indeed there is no ambiguity. For implementation of this
idea see subsections 3.3 – 3.4 and section 4.
Finally, let θu ∈ [0, 1) be the CRRA coefficient, and let θ := (θfk , θ
D
k , θ
u) ∈ Θ
be the vector of model parameters where Θ denotes the parameter space.
3.2. Empirical Environment and the Likelihood. We observe a sample of
bid data from Tn auctions with n ∈ N := {n, . . . , n} bidders in each auction. Let
z represent the entire sample, i.e., z := {(b1,n,tn , . . . , bn,n,tn)
Tn
tn=1}n∈N such that
total sample size is |z| =
∑
n∈N nTn. We assume that for every tn = 1, . . . , Tn
8 Note: every model under consideration must have a positive prior mass. With the
specification (10), it is easy to put a positive prior mass on the model of no ambiguity
because θD0 ≤ 0⇔ D(γ) = γ.
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and every n ∈ N
v1,n,tn, . . . , vn,n,tn
iid
∼ F0(·)
and the bids are equilibrium outcomes so that bin,n,tn = βn(vin,n,tn, F0(·)). Fol-
lowing Assumption 4 we note that F0(·) does not depend on n. Since the values
are independent across auctions and bidders, the bids are also independent
across all auctions and bidders in the sample.
Let βn(·|θ) be the equilibrium bidding strategy and β
′
n(·|θ) its derivative,
where θ is a parameter, and let b¯n(θ) := βn(1|θ) be the highest bid. The joint
density of the data can be written as
p∗(z|θ) =
∏
n∈N
Tn∏
tn=1
n∏
in=1
f [β−1n (bin,n,tn|θ)|θ]
1[bin,n,tn ≤ b¯n(θ)]
β ′n[β
−1
n (bin,n,tn |θ)|θ]
. (11)
Since there is no closed form expression for the likelihood (11), the inverse
bidding function and its derivative have to be numerically approximated at
every observed bid in z, which can be time consuming especially when |z| is
large. To circumvent this we follow Kim (2014) and discretize the bid space
and use the associated multinomial likelihood.9
To develop the multinomial likelihood we need to introduce some new no-
tations. Let Bn ⊂ [0, 1] include all bids {bin,n,tn} for a given n, and let
{[b∗dn−1, b
∗
dn
]}Dndn=1 denote the sequence of bins such that Bn = ∪
Dn
dn=1
[b∗dn−1, b
∗
dn
].
Let v∗dn := β
−1
n (b
∗
dn
|θ) be the inverse bid for all knot points in (b∗1, . . . , b
∗
Dn). The
bin probability is then given by
πdn(θ) = Pr(b ∈ [b
∗
dn−1, b
∗
dn ]|θ) = Pr(v ∈ [v
∗
dn−1, v
∗
dn ]|θ) =
∫ v∗
dn
v∗
dn−1
f(v|θ)dv.
Since βn(·|θ) is strictly increasing, we can determine (v
∗
1, . . . , v
∗
Dn) using the
piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomial method and evaluate πdn(θ)
at the knot points (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
Dn) with ease because f(v|θ) is a mixture of the
Beta densities.
In addition, let ydn :=
∑Tn
tn=1
∑n
in=1
1(bin,n,tn ∈ [b
∗
dn−1, b
∗
dn ]) be the number
of bids in [b∗dn−1, b
∗
dn
] for dn ∈ {1, . . . , Dn}, n ∈ N . The associated sample
histogram for each n ∈ N is then yn := (y1, . . . , yDn), which can be viewed as
a nonparametric estimate of the bid density, up to a normalization. The joint
9 Kim (2014) developed a Bayesian method with a simulated likliehood, which does not
have simulation errors.
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probability mass of Y := {yn}n∈N is then given as
p(Y |θ) ∝
∏
n∈N
Dn∏
dn=1
{πdn(θ)}
ydn . (12)
We use the likelihood to draw random parameters from the posterior
θ(1), . . . , θ(S) ∼ p(θ|Y ) ∝ p(θ)p(Y |θ)
with a prior density function p(θ) over Θ, using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) method such as the Gaussian Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
3.3. Illustration. In this subsection, we explain the implementation of the
method using a simulated bid sample. We first outline the data generating
process (DGP), describe the prior distribution, and we provide a detailed steps
to compute the posterior and use the posterior for inference and decision making.
3.3.1. Simulated Data. The valuation density f 0(·) in this subsection is a mix-
ture of the uniform density on [0, 1] and Beta densities with parameters (2,4)
with mixing weights of 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. The density f 0(·) is not nested
in the BPD in (9). We use the superscript 0 to denote the true parameter. The
DGP we use is presented in Figure 3: Panel (a) shows f 0(·), panel (b) shows
the D-function (solid line), and panel (c) shows the CRRA utility function with
θ0u = 0.3 (solid). The dashed lines in panels (b) and (c) are the 45
◦-lines that
represent ambiguity and risk neutrality, respectively. The triplet (f 0, D0, θu0 )
collects the model primitives. Panel (d) represents the seller’s expected rev-
enue, Π0n(ρ), as a function of reserve price, ρ.
We consider auctions with N = {2, 5}. Let ρ0n := argmaxρΠ
0
n(ρ) denote the
revenue maximizing reserve price (henceforth, RMRP). The RMRPs are ρ0n=2 =
0.25 and ρ0n=5 = 0.14 and the corresponding (maximized) revenues are 0.309 and
0.524, respectively. The RMRP ρ0n depends on n unless bidders are both risk
and ambiguity neutral. Choosing the right RMRP is more important than using
zero reserve price when n = 2 than when n = 5, because Π0n=2(ρ
0
n=2) is 3.73%
more than Π0n=2(0) while, because of competition, Π
0
n=5(ρ
0
n=5) ≈ Π
0
n=5(0). From
this DGP we draw 300 bids for each auction with n bidders, so (Tn=2, Tn=5) =
(150, 60), with 600 total bids. Let z1 denote this simulated data.
10 In Figure
5 we present the summary statistics (sample mean, standard deviation, and
skewness) of the sample by the solid lines.
10 We index the data by 1 because it is the first dataset in the Monte Carlo experiment,
and we will have more later.
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Figure 3. Data Generating Process and Revenue Functions
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Panal (a) shows the valuation density, panel (b) plots the D function in solid line and the
45◦-line in dashed line. Panel (c) shows the CRRA utility function (θu = 0.3) with the
45◦-line. Finally, panel (d) demonstrates the seller’s expected revenues as a function of
reserve price for n ∈ {2, 5} bidder auctions.
3.3.2. Prior Specification. The econometrician should choose a prior distribu-
tion to reflect his beliefs and uncertainty about θ. In this section, however,
since we know the DGP, our prior beliefs would be a degenerate distribution
that approximates the DGP. Using such a strong prior would prevent us from
effectively examining the performance of our method, so we choose a prior dis-
tribution that is fairly diffuse and relatively easy to specify and evaluate. We
assume that θfk , θ
D
k , and θ
u are jointly independent under the prior:
p(θ) = p(θu)p(θfk )p(θ
D
k ). (13)
We adopt the prior independence only for convenience, but the posterior would
coherently update the inter-dependency as suggested by the data z1. Now, we
can specify each component on the RHS of (13). First, we use the uniform prior
on [0, 0.9] for θu by which we will rule out unreasonably strong risk aversion
and avoid numerical errors that arise when θu is too close to 1. Second, we use
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Figure 5. Posterior Predictive Analysis
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Each panel demonstrate the distribution of the summary statistics by dots of the bid data
under the prior, and the summary statistics (sample mean, standard deviation, and
skewness) of the original data in solid lines. When n = 2, n = 5 the statistics are
(0.23, 0.12, 0.40) and (0.32, 0.18, 0.62), respectively.
the Dirichlet process prior for θfk , i.e.,
p
(
θf1,k, . . . , θ
f
k,k
)
∝
k∏
j=1
(
θfj,k
)af
0
af
j,k
,
where af0 > 0 and (a
f
1,k, . . . , a
f
k,k) ∈ ∆k−1. This form of prior has been widely
used in nonparametric Bayesian analysis with k being a random parameter with
full support over N. Here, afj,k represents the prior belief on the probability that
v ∈
[
j−1
k−1
, j
k−1
]
when v ∼ f(v|θfk), the BPD in (9), and a
f
0 represents the strength
of this belief. For more formal treatment see Ferguson (1973); Escobar and West
(1995); Petrone (1999a,b). We set af0a
f
j,k = 0.1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, which is
a weak belief on the uniform distribution. Third, we construct the prior for θDk
as:
p
(
θDk
)
∝
∏k−1
j=2
(
θDj,k
)aD0 aDj,k 1 (D(γ|θDk ) > 0)× 1 (D′(γ|θDk ) > 0)1 (θD0 ∈ [−0.05, 0.55]) ,
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where aD0 > 0, (a
D
2,k, . . . , a
D
k−1,k) ∈ ∆k−3 and set a
D
0 a
D
j,k = 0.1 for all j ∈ {2, ·, k−
1}. The first two indicators impose the sign and shape restrictions on the D-
function that it be positive and strictly increasing so that F ∗(·) is always a valid
CDF. The last indicator allows the smallest value for θD0 to be −0.05, which is
related to the prior beliefs for ambiguity neutrality. But, the upper bound 0.55
is sufficiently large so that it does not impose any restriction on the shape of
D-function. Finally, we set k = 6.11
Before computing the posterior it is useful to check the information content in
the prior and the model about the data by a prior predictive analysis (Geweke,
2005). We draw θ from the prior and use it to generate a bid sample of size
equal as z1, and calculate the same summary statistics (sample mean, standard
deviation and skewness) as before. We repeat this exercise five hundred times
and in Figure 5 present the scatter plots of these statistics to visualize the
implications of the prior. The fact that the points are scattered around the
statistics of z1 suggests that the chosen prior is diffuse and the data z1 can be
rationalized by the prior (the intersection of the red lines are contained in the
support of the prior). We find that the prior probability of ambiguity neutrality
is about 26%.
3.3.3. Posterior Computation. In order to explore the posterior distribution, we
employ the Adaptive Metropolis (henceforth, AM) algorithm of Haario, Saksman, and Tamminen
(2001), which is a (slight) variation of the Gaussian Metropolis-Hastings (hence-
forth, GMH) algorithm.
Let θ(s) be the sth draw from the algorithm and Ω be a covariance matrix
of appropriate dimension that confirms with θ. Under the GMH algorithm, we
draw a candidate θ˜ from N(θ(s),Ω) and define θ(s+1) := θ˜ with probability
min
{
1,
p(θ˜)p(Y |θ˜)
p(θ(s))p(Y |θ(s))
}
(14)
and θ(s+1) := θ(s) with the remaining probability. Since N(θ(s),Ω) has a full
support on the Euclidean space, from Theorem 4.5.5 in Geweke (2005) we know
11 We could use different smoothing parameters for the valuation density and the D-
function, but we use the same k for both only for computational convenience. In addition, we
could formally choose k using the Bayesian model selection or allow k to be random (Bayesian
nonparametric analysis), but we choose k because it seems sufficiently flexible for all exercises
in this paper and yet its computation cost is reasonable in the Monte Carlo experiments
where we implement the method many times. Aryal and Kim (2013); Kim (2013, 2014) chose
k formally and Petrone (1999a,b) treated k as a random parameter.
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that irrespective of the initial point θ(0) for any measurable function h(·), as
S →∞,
1
S
S∑
s=1
h(θ(s))
a.s
−→ E[h(θ)|Y ] =
∫
h(θ)p(θ|Y )dθ.
For example, h(·) can be the valuation density (9) or theD-function. In practice,
the performance of the GMH algorithm, however, depends on the choice of the
scale parameter Ω. If Ω is too small, θ˜ will be very close to θ(s) and the GMH
algorithm would not effectively explore the parameter space Θ, and if Ω is too
large, the proposal function often generates candidates θ˜ that is unlikely under
the posterior and would most likely be rejected. If θ is a low dimensional vector,
it is possible to choose an appropriate Ω, but not so if it is a high dimensional
vector.
To address this problem we employ the AM algorithm, which automati-
cally tunes Ω using the history of θ(1), . . . , θ(s−1) at each sth step. Specifically,
Haario, Saksman, and Tamminen (2001) suggested using
Ωs =
{
Ω0 if s ≤ s0
c(|θ|)cov(θ(0), θ(1), . . . , θ(s−1)) + c(|θ|)εI|θ| if s > s0,
(15)
where c(|θ|) is a constant that depends on |θ|, the dimension of θ, Ω0 is an
initial covariance matrix, ε is a small positive constant, and I|θ| is the identity
matrix. The AM algorithm, which uses Ωs instead of Ω, converges to the pos-
terior if the posterior is bounded from above and has a bounded support. Both
conditions are satisfied in our case because the prior has bounded support and
the multinomial likelihood is bounded from above.
Like Haario, Saksman, and Tamminen (2001), we use c(|θ|) = 2.4/(2k −
2),Ω0 = 0.001I|θ|, s0 = 100 and ε = 0.0001.
12 Then, we draw the param-
eters from the posterior distribution using the AM algorithm, and to reduce
autocorrelation across draws we record only every 100th outcomes. To check
the convergence of the parameter draws, we use the separated partial means
test in Geweke (2005), section 4.7. The idea of the test is as follows: Suppose
we have a sample {θ(s); s = 1, . . . , S} drawn from a fixed distribution and divide
the sample into four equal blocks. Then the null hypothesis must be true that
the mean of second block {θ(s); s = S/4+1, . . . , S/2} is equal to the mean of the
fourth block {θ(s); s = 3S/4+1, . . . , S}. We test the null for each component of
12 Small Ω0 ensures that the algorithm accepts some candidates at early steps and, there-
fore, the early history of θ(1), . . . , θ(s0) before updating Ωs is not degenerate.
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Figure 7. Parameter Draws from the AM algorithm
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The left panels show the parameters of valuation density, and the right panels show the
parameters for D-function and the utility function (bottom).
θ, so we have |θ| many p-values, and terminate the algorithm when the smallest
p-value exceeds 0.01.
We run the test at the 200, 000th iteration for the first time. If some p-values
are smaller than 0.01, we additionally iterate the AM algorithm 10,000 times
and again check the convergence. We continue this until the algorithm stops.
Therefore the final S is random. We use the last seventy five percent of the
iterations, {θ(s); s = S/4+1, . . . , S}, for inference and decision making. The test
ensures that these parameters are drawn from the posterior and can therefore
be used for policy analysis. Since our stopping criteria requires the worst case
to pass the test, this decision rule is conservative.
In our exercise with the data z1, the smallest and the average p-value we
record for convergence are 0.19 and 0.64, respectively, at the 200, 000th iteration.
See Figure 7 for the times series of outcomes. The X-axis is the length of
the series, which is 2,000 because we record every 100th outcome. The left
panels show the parameters of valuation density, and the right panels show the
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Figure 9. Posterior Predictive Analysis
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Figure 10. *
Each panel demonstrate the distribution of the summary statistics by dots of the bid data
under the posterior along with the summary statistics of the original data in solid lines.
Note that the ranges for each panel and the solid lines are the same as the ones in Figure 5.
parameters for D-function and the utility function (bottom). The two dashed
horizontal lines in panel for θD0 , (fourth from top) indicate the negative range of
θD0 – recall that θ
D
0 can be negative in which case the D-function is the identity,
i.e. no ambiguity aversion. The red dashed line in the panel for θu is the true
CRRA coefficient which is set at 0.3.
3.3.4. Posterior Analysis and Decision Making. We begin with a posterior pre-
dictive analysis, just like the prior predictive analysis. For each θ(s), drawn
from the posterior, we generate a bid sample of size |z1| and compute the same
summary statistics: sample mean, standard deviation, and skewness. The re-
sults are presented in Figure 9, and as can be seen, the posterior distribution
accurately predicts the summary statistics of the actual data z1 very precisely.
Before discussing the posterior analysis further, it would be useful to make
a formal distinction between the concepts of accuracy and precision, which are
often confused, though widely used. An estimate is said to be accurate, when
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it is in a small neighborhood of the true quantity. Since we know the DGP in
this section, we can measure the accuracy by computing the L2-distance. On
the other hand, the estimate is precise, if there is little uncertainty around the
estimate where the concepts of uncertainty further depends on the philosophi-
cal views on statistics. In Bayesian statistics, the parameter is random whereas
data are fixed. The posterior captures the parameter uncertainty conditional
on the fixed data, and the posterior credible sets and/or the posterior stan-
dard deviation are often reported as a measure of uncertainty. In contrast, in
a frequentist analysis, the parameter is fixed, but there is uncertainty about
the estimate because data are random. This kind of uncertainty is quantified
by the sampling distribution of the estimator, which is often measured by an
asymptotic standard errors or confidence sets. The estimate is, therefore, pre-
cise when the posterior (sampling) distribution is condensed from the Bayesian
(frequentist) point of view. In this section, we use the Bayesian precision, but
we examine, in section 4, the frequentist uncertainty by repeated sampling,
{zm}
M
m=1.
The posterior predictive valuation density is given by the most widely used
Bayesian density estimate
f̂(v|Y ) :=
1
S
S∑
s=1
f(v|θ(s))
a.s
−→ E[f(v|θ)|Y ] (16)
as S → ∞ for v ∈ [0, 1]. Figure 11 (a) shows the estimate f̂(v|Y ) with its
point-wise 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles posterior credible band in dashed lines and
the true density f 0(·) in a solid line. More specifically, recall that we use 1,500
parameters drawn from the posterior, which means we have 1,500 valuation
densities. For every point v ∈ [0, 1], the middle dashed line represents the
average of these 1,500 densities, i.e, (16), and 95% of the densities pass between
the upper and the lower dashed lines. The 95% credible band is narrow, which
means the posterior inference on the valuation density is precise. Moreover,
the narrow credible band contains f 0(·) and f̂(v|Y ) ≈ f 0(v) over the entire
support [0, 1]; the estimate is accurate. Furthermore, because we know f 0(·),
we can measure the accuracy by the L2-distance between estimate and the true
density:
d[f̂(·|Y ), f 0(·)] =
{∫
[f̂(x|Y )− f 0(x)]2dx
}1/2
= 0.069.
Figure 11 (b) is the histogram of {θu,(s)} (CRRA coefficient) drawn from the
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Figure 11. Posterior of Correct Model
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Figure 12. *
Panel (a) shows the posterior of the valuation density by its point-wise mean and a 95%
credible band. Panel (b) is the posterior of the CRRA coefficients. Panel (c) summarizes
the posterior of the D-function. Panels (d) and (e) show the posterior of revenue functions
for n = 2 and n = 5 cases. On panels (a), (c), (d), and (e), the true quantities are the solid
line. (Panel (c) shows the identity.)
posterior distribution. Define the Bayesian estimate for the CRRA coefficient
as
θ̂u :=
1
S
S∑
s=1
θu,(s)
a.s
−→ E[θu|Y ] as S →∞,
which is the posterior mean of θu. We obtain θ̂u = 0.29(≈ θu0 = 0.3) with the
posterior standard deviation of 0.14. The posterior predictive D(γ) for γ ∈ [0, 1]
is given by
D̂(γ|Y ) :=
1
S
S∑
s=1
D(γ|θ(s))
a.s
−→ E[D(γ|θ)|Y ], as S →∞.
Figure 11 (c) shows D̂(·|Y ) and its pointwise 2.5 and 97.5 posterior percentiles
(dashed line). It appears that the credible band contains D0(·) (solid line), and
d[D̂(·|Y ), D0(·)] = 0.018, which suggests the high accuracy of our estimate.
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The posterior probability that bidders are ambiguity neutral is estimated by
1
S
S∑
s=1
1
[
θ
D,(s)
0 < 0
]
a.s
−→ E
[
θ
D,(s)
0 < 0
∣∣∣Y ] , as S →∞. (17)
We find that the posterior probability is only 2.13%, thus providing a strong
evidence of ambiguity aversion.
Next, we consider the decision problem of choosing a reserve price ρ to max-
imize the seller’s expected revenue. Let Πn(θ, ρ) denote the seller’s expected
revenue at ρ under θ ∈ Θ in a first price auction with n bidders. Then, the
posterior predictive revenue is given as
E[Πn(θ, ρ)|Y ] =
∫
Θ
Πn(θ, ρ)p(θ|Y )dθ. (18)
The subjective expected utility theory Savage (1954); Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) postulates that it is rational to maximize (18). Let ρBn := argmaxρE[Πn(θ, ρ)|Y ],
which is called the Bayes action.13 In order to choose ρBn , we estimate (18) by
Π̂n(ρ) :=
1
S
S∑
s=1
Πn(θ
(s), ρ), (19)
which is shown in Figure 11 (d) for n = 2 ( and Figure 11 (e) for n = 5) along
with a 95% posterior credible band (dashed line). The 1st line of Table 1 shows
that ρBn=2 = 0.26 at which the posterior predicts the revenue Π̂n=2(ρ
B
n=2) =
0.312. Moreover, the 2.5 and 97.5 posterior percentiles of Π̂n=2(θ, ρ
B
n=2) form
a 95% posterior credible interval [0.296, 0.329] for the revenue at ρBn=2. This
interval includes the true revenue, Π0n=2(ρ
B
n=2) = 0.309, which is essentially
equal to Π0n=2(ρ
0
n=2) where ρ
0
n = argmaxρΠ
0
n(ρ). Hence, there is no revenue
loss of using ρBn=2 relative to using ρ
0
n=2. The 4
th line of Table 1 summarizes the
policy implications for n = 5.
3.4. Discussion. Before we conclude this section, we discuss why we employ
the direct approach in the Bayesian framework instead of adopting the indirect
approach that has been used since Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) – the lat-
ter first estimates the bid distribution functions and recovers the primitives from
the estimates by the first order conditions. First, since it is relatively straight-
forward to impose shape restrictions under the direct approach, we may easily
13 The solution ρBn is also optimal under the average risk principle, a widely used frequen-
tist decision criteria; see Berger (1985); Kim (2013, 2014). Moreover, we note that estimation
problem is a special case of decision making problem where the posterior mean of the pa-
rameter is the Bayes action with respect to the squared error loss. Therefore, the Bayesian
estimates are decision theoretically optimal.
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develop an empirical framework where the econometric method is internally
consistent with the underlying economic model. For example, the monotonic-
ity of bidding functions is automatically satisfied under the direct approach,
but the inverse bidding function associated with the estimated bid distribution
functions (indirect approach) may not be monotone unless explicitly imposed.
Such a violation of shape conditions may lower efficiency because the available
information is not fully exploited, and it would also invalidate policy recom-
mendations because counterfactual analysis under an alternative policy should
be valid only when the model assumption(s), like bidding monotonicity, are
satisfied, see Kim (2014).
Second, today, computing is far more powerful than that of a few decades
ago and it is much cheaper. By providing a computationally feasible nonpara-
metric framework, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) has widely broadened
the scope of the empirical auction literature, which had, in 90’s or before, relied
upon tightly specified statistical models within a few very simple theoretical
paradigms mostly because of the computational difficulties for evaluating the
likelihoods. We no longer have such computational restrictions. In the next sec-
tions, we run our empirical methods in many Monte Carlo experiments using
authors’ desktop/laptop computers.
Once the direct approach is chosen, the Bayesian approach has several ad-
vantages over frequentist methods. The statistical model for bid data from first
price auctions is irregular because the support of bids depends on parameters
of interest. Hirano and Porter (2003) shows that in this case the Bayesian esti-
mator is efficient but the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is not.14 More-
over, the Bayesian method provides a natural environment of decision theoretic
framework that is useful for the seller who wishes to choose a reserve price to
maximize the expected revenues; see Aryal and Kim (2013); Kim (2013, 2014).
Finally, the Bayesian method can be more useful in a case of the parameter on
the boundary of the parameter space, where both the Bayesian estimator and
the MLE are typically biased. As mentioned earlier, by putting a positive prior
mass on the subspace of the parameter space, however, we may reduce the bias
of the Bayesian analysis. For example, even if the true D-function is the identity
(no ambiguity), the empirical method that restricts D-function to be bounded
above by the identity function will produce downwardly biased estimates. We
14 The results of Hirano and Porter (2003) hold under fairly weak assumptions on loss
functions and priors, including the ones we use in this paper – the error squared loss and the
expected revenue. (The negative of the revenue is the loss for our analysis.)
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Table 1. Posterior Analysis for Seller Revenue
Bayes Predictive 95 % Credible True Rev. at Rev. Loss (%)
Action Revenue Interval for B. Action, ρBn wrt Max. Rev.
ρBn Π̂n(ρ
B
n ) Revenue Π
0
n(ρ
B
n ) [(D)-(B)]/(B)
(A) (B) (C) (D) ×100% = (E)
n = 2 Correct 0.26 0.312 [0.296,0.329] 0.309 0.000
Redundant 0.28 0.297 [0.283,0.310] 0.292 0.083
Misspecified 0.12 0.316 [0.308,0.324] 0.301 2.651
n = 5 Correct 0.11 0.538 [0.513,0.563] 0.524 0.000
Redundant 0.12 0.496 [0.480,0.512] 0.485 0.000
Misspecified 0.10 0.537 [0.513,0.557] 0.524 0.000
Table 2. *
Column (A) shows the Bayes action and columns (B) and (C) summarizes the posterior
distribution of the revenue at the Bayes action by the mean and a 95% credible interval.
Column (D) shows the true revenue at the Bayes action and column (E) the revenue loss of
using the Bayes action relative to the true maximum revenue.
handle this problem by putting a positive prior mass on the event that θD0 < 0.
In the next section, we confirm that such a prior mass enables the posterior to
predict the D- function to be the identity mapping when there is no ambiguity.
The cost of this is that when there is ambiguity, the posterior puts a positive
albeit negligible probability on the identity.
4. Monte Carlo Study
In this section, we examine the performance of our Bayesian method in a
repeated sampling for three different cases: (i) Correct model – where bidders
are ambiguity averse and the econometrician allows ambiguity aversion; (ii) Re-
dundant model – bidders are ambiguity neutral, but the econometrician allows
ambiguity aversion; and (iii) Misspecified model – bidders are ambiguity averse
but the econometrician ignores it. For each case, we study the sampling dis-
tributions of the Bayesian predictive estimates and quantify the effect of the
model choice on seller’s expected revenue. To summarize our result: we show
that our method performs well when there is ambiguity (correct) and it does
still so even when there is no ambiguity (redundant). Especially, there is no
discernible effect of over specification – redundantly modeling ambiguity when
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Figure 13. Monte Carlo Study for Correct Model
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Figure 14. *
Panel (a) shows the sampling distribution of the estimated valuation densities by its
pointwise mean and a 95% frequency band. Panel (c) is the histogram of the CRRA
estimates. Panel (c) demonstrates the sampling distribution of the estimated D functions.
Panels (d) and (e) are for the estimated revenue functions with alternative numbers of
bidders. The solid lines represent the true quantities.
there is none – on the seller’s revenue. However, if we use a misspecified model
and ignore ambiguity, then it may cause a substantial revenue loss. We conclude
this section by studying the case where we have a larger set of N .
4.1. Correct Model. We draw M datasets {zm}
M
m=1 independently from the
DGP shown in Figure 3. Then, for each data realization, we apply our method in
subsection 3.3. This Monte Carlo study generates estimates {f̂m, D̂m, θ̂
u
m}
M
m=1
and the Bayes actions and associated true revenues {ρBn,m,Π
0
n(ρ
B
n,m)}
M
m=1 for
n ∈ {2, 5}. We use M = 300 and analyze z1 in subsection 3.3.
Figure 13(a) summarizes the sampling distribution of {f̂m}
M
m=1 by their point-
wise mean, and the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles (dashed line). The pointwise mean
closely approximates f 0 (solid line) and the 95% frequency band is narrow. As
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discussed in subsection 3.3.4, the sampling distribution of estimates here is dif-
ferent from the posterior distribution in subsection 3.3: the latter quantifies
the uncertainty regarding θ for a given data z1 whereas the former represents
the variation of the Bayesian estimate (posterior mean) associated with the
randomness of z.
The sampling distribution of {D̂m}
M
m=1 is similarly shown in panel (c). All
other curves in the panel have the same interpretation as before. Table 3 doc-
uments that the mean integrated squared error (MISE) of f̂ is 0.0083 and
the MISE of D̂ is 0.0009, which shows the high accuracy of our method.15
Panel (b) presents the histogram of {θ̂um}
M
m=1 – the sample mean is 0.293 and
the standard deviation is 0.017. The mean squared error (MSE) is given as
E[(θ̂u − θu0 )
2] = 0.007 where the expectation is taken over the sample z.
Panels (d) and (e) in Figure 13 display the sampling distributions of {Π̂n=2,m}
M
m=1
and {Π̂n=5,m}
M
m=1, respectively. Recall that Π̂n(ρ) denotes the posterior predic-
tive revenue in (19) and the Bayes action is ρBn := argmaxρ Π̂n(ρ). More-
over, Π0n(ρ) is the true revenue, unknown to the seller; see Figure 3(d), and
ρ0n := argmaxρΠ
0
n(ρ), which is infeasible. The seller can, therefore, choose ρ
B
n
and obtain the true revenue of Π0n(ρ
B
n ) – we focus on the sampling distribution
of {ρBn,m,Π
0
n(ρ
B
n,m)}
M
m=1. The average of {ρ
B
n=2,m}
M
m=1 is 0.248 with standard de-
viation of 0.037 and the average of {Π0n=2(ρ
B
n=2,m)}
M
m=1 is 0.308 with standard
deviation of 0.001. Moreover, the average revenue loss of employing ρBn=2 with
respect to Π0n=2(ρ
0
n=2) is only 0.398%.
Finally, we consider larger samples: (i) (Tn=2, Tn=5) = (300, 120), i.e., 2Tn=2+
5Tn=5 = 1, 200; and (ii) (Tn=2, Tn=5) = (600, 240), i.e., 2Tn=2 + 5Tn=5 = 2, 400.
For each case, we repeat the Monte Carlo experiments with M = 300 replica-
tions, as described above, and find that the estimates get more accurate and
the revenue loss decreases as the sample size increases, see Table 3.
4.2. Redundant Model. We generate datasets {zm}
M
m=1 independently from
the DGP shown in Figure 3 except that we use D0(γ) = γ, i.e., the model of no
ambiguity aversion. In other words, there is no ambiguity among bidders. Then,
for each zm, we apply our method as before that allows ambiguity aversion.
We discuss first the posterior analysis for the first dataset z1 and then in-
vestigate the sampling distribution using many datasets, {zm}
M
m=1. The prior
15 Let fˆy be an estimate constructed by data y for the true function f0. Then,MISE(fˆ) =∫
Ey
[
(fˆ(x) − f0(x))
2
]
dx =
∫
Vy[fˆ(x)]dx+
∫
{Ey[fˆ(x)]− f0(x)}
2dx = variance2+bias2. The
MISE is small only when the variance and the bias are both small.
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Table 3. Monte Carlo Study, N = {2, 5}
Total N. MISE(f̂) MISE(D̂) MSE(θ̂u) Rev. Loss (%)
Specification of bids (A) (B) (C) n = 2 (D)
Correct 600 0.0083 0.0009 0.007 0.398
1,200 0.0054 0.0006 0.006 0.307
2,400 0.0040 0.0004 0.005 0.165
Redundant 600 0.0049 0.0004 0.007 0.189
1,200 0.0025 0.0004 0.005 0.094
2,400 0.0015 0.0003 0.004 0.010
Misspecified 600 0.0214 0.0128 0.078 2.898
1200 0.0230 0.0128 0.087 3.246
2400 0.0253 0.0128 0.092 3.439
Table 4. *
Columns (A) and (B) documents the MISEs of the valuation density estimate and the D
function estimate, respectively. Column (C) shows the MSE of the estimate for the CRRA
coefficient. Column (D) provides the revenue loss of the Bayes auction relative to the true
maximum revenue.
and posterior predictive analyses on the summary statistics of z1 produce al-
most identical results as Figures 5 and 9. Figure 15 presents the posterior
distributions for the quantities of interest as in Figure 11. It is noticeable that
D̂(γ) ≈ D0(γ) = γ and its 95% credible band is narrow, correctly predicting
that the bidders would not be ambiguity averse.16 Moreover, we find that the
posterior probability for no ambiguity aversion (17) is 55% whereas the prior
probability is 26%. If we choose a model between ambiguity averse model and
ambiguity neutral model, according to the Bayesian model selection, we would
select the one with the largest posterior probability.17 Thus, since the posterior
odd ratio is
posterior Pr( no ambiguity aversion )
posterior Pr( ambiguity aversion )
=
0.55
0.45
> 1,
we would choose the model of no ambiguity aversion.
16 Since D(·|θ) is restricted to be below the identity; see (10), the pointwise upper bound
cannot be larger than D0.
17 The Bayesian model comparison is often approximated by the Bayesian information
criteria or the Akaike Information criteria, each assuming a different prior.
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Figure 15 also shows that f̂ and Π̂n closely approximate f
0 and Π0n with nar-
row credible bands, even when the redundant modeling of ambiguity aversion
creates additional parameter uncertainty. Furthermore, the redundant mod-
eling does not invalidate the policy recommendation of our method. The 2nd
line of Table 1 shows that ρBn=2 = 0.28 at which the posterior predicts the rev-
enue Π̂n=2(ρ
B
n=2) = 0.297. Moreover, the 2.5 and 97.5 posterior percentiles of
Π̂n=2(θ, ρ
B
n=2) form a 95% posterior credible interval [0.283, 0.310] for the rev-
enue at ρBn=2. This interval includes the true revenue, Π
0
n=2(ρ
B
n=2) = 0.290,
which is very close to Π0n=2(ρ
0
n=2) – the revenue loss of using ρ
B
n=2 relative to
using ρ0n=2 is only 0.083%. The 5
th line of Table 1 also summarizes the policy
implications on the seller’s revenue for n = 5. Note that the true revenue func-
tion is different from the one in the previous subsection because D here is the
identity.
Now, we consider the repeated sampling, which generates estimates {f̂m, D̂m, θ̂
u
m}
M
m=1
and the Bayes actions and associated true revenues {ρBn,m,Π
0
n(ρ
B
n,m)}
M
m=1 for
n ∈ {2, 5}. Figure 17 summarizes the sampling distribution of the estimates
of interest. The distributions of {f̂m}
M
m=1, {D̂m}
M
m=1, and {Π̂n,m}
M
m=1 closely
approximate the true quantities (accurate) and their 95% frequency bands are
all narrow (precise). Table 3 documents that the mean integrated squared er-
ror (MISE) of f̂ is 0.0049 and the MISE of D̂ is 0.0004, which also shows the
high accuracy of our method. Panel (b) shows the histogram of {θ̂um}
M
m=1 – the
estimate is slightly underestimated, but Table 3 documents that the accuracy
measured by MSE is 0.007, which is the same as the correct model. Moreover,
the Bayes action ρBn generates essentially optimal revenues. Finally, we find that
the estimates get more accurate and the revenue loss decreases as the sample
size grows; see Table 3.
In summary: even if bidders are not ambiguity averse, the redundant model-
ing of D-function would neither lower accuracy/precision of the estimates nor
invalidate policy recommendations.
4.3. Misspecified Model. We generate datasets {zm}
M
m=1 independently from
the DGP shown in Figure 3 with the D0(γ) on panel (b), i.e., bidders are
ambiguity averse. So, the DGP is the same as the one in subsection 4.1, but we
assume that the econometrician ignores the presence of ambiguity. That is, for
each zm, we apply our method constraining D to be the identity to investigate
the effect of such misspecification on estimates and policy implications.
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Figure 15. Posterior of Redundant Model
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Figure 16. *
Panel (a) shows the posterior of the valuation density by its pointwise mean and a 95%
credible band. Panel (b) is the posterior of the CRRA coefficients. Panel (c) summarizes
the posterior of the D-function. Panels (d) and (e) show the posterior of revenue functions
for n = 2 and n = 5 cases. On panels (a), (c), (d), and (e), the true quantities are the solid
line. (Panel (c) shows the identity.)
We examine the posterior analysis first for the first data set z1. The prior
predictive analysis on the summary statistics of z1 is almost identical to the
results as Figure 5 in the sense that the data can be regarded as a typical
realization under the prior, which is diffuse. However, the posterior distribution
of the summary statistics, especially for n = 2, does not predict the data;
see Figure 19, which suggests that econometrician may need to improve the
specification or revise the model. In addition, Figure 21 shows that the posterior
credible band for the valuation density does not include f 0 over a large portion
of the support and the support of the posterior of θu does not contain true θu0 ,
i.e., the estimates are inaccurate.
The failure of modeling ambiguity aversion can invalidate the policy recom-
mendation. Table 1 shows that ρBn=2 = 0.12 which predicts the revenue of
Π̂n=2(ρ
B
n=2) = 0.316 with the 95% credible interval of [0.308, 0.324]. But, this
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Figure 17. Monte Carlo Study for Redundant Model
value
0 0.5 1
de
ns
ity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
(a) Density Estimate
CRRA
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
hi
st
og
ra
m
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
(b) CRRA coefficient
True Probability
0 0.5 1
D
is
to
rte
d 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c) D function
Reserve Price
0 0.5 1
R
ev
en
ue
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
(d) Revenue Function, n = 2
Reserve Price
0 0.5 1
R
ev
en
ue
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
(e) Revenue Function, n = 5
Figure 18. *
Panel (a) shows the sampling distribution of the estimated valuation densities by its
pointwise mean and a 95% frequency band. Panel (c) is the histogram of the CRRA
estimates. Panel (c) demonstrates the sampling distribution of the estimated D functions.
Panels (d) and (e) are for the estimated revenue functions with alternative numbers of
bidders. The solid lines represent the true quantities.
credible interval does not contain the true revenue Π0n=2(ρ
B
n=2) = 0.301 and,
thereby, the revenue prediction is not accurate. Furthermore, the revenue loss
of using ρBn=2 under the misspecification relative to the largest revenue is ap-
proximately 2.65%. This revenue loss can also be regarded as the revenue loss
relative to the correct model because the latter produces essentially the true
maximum revenue.
Now, we investigate the sampling distribution of the estimates {f̂m, D̂m, θ̂
u
m}
M
m=1
and the Bayes actions and associated true revenues {ρBn,m,Π
0
n(ρ
B
n,m)}
M
m=1 for
n ∈ {2, 5}. Figure 23 summarizes the sampling distribution of the estimates
of interest. The distributions of {f̂m}
M
m=1 does not approximate the true f
0
and the CRRA coefficients are so overestimated that the true θu0 is not in the
support of the histogram. Table 3 documents that the MISE of f̂ is 0.0214,
which is 2.57 times larger than the MISE of f̂ for the correctly specified case,
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Figure 19. Posterior Predictive Analysis of Misspecified Model
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Figure 20. *
Each panel demonstrate the distribution of the summary statistics by dots of the bid data
under the posterior along with the summary statistics of the original data in solid lines.
and the MSE of θ̂u is ten times larger. Moreover, the revenue loss of ρBn under
the misspecification is about 2.9% relative to the true optimal revenue Π0n(ρ
0
n).
Finally, we find that the estimates does not get more accurate (MISE of f̂) as
the sample size grows and the revenue loss does not disappear.
Therefore, when the empirical analysis does not take into account the ambigu-
ity aversion, the estimates can be inaccurate and the policy recommendations
can be invalid, unlike the case where the ambiguity is redundantly modeled
when there is no ambiguity.
4.4. Rich variation in n. Until now, we have considered N1 = {2, 5}, i.e.,
we observe auctions with two bidders and auctions with five bidders. Here, we
examine the empirical environment in which there is a richer variation in the
number of bidders – we consider N2 := {2, 4, 5} and then N3 := {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
For both N2 and N3, as before, we study the cases that we observe 600 bids
in total, 1,200 bids, and 2,400 bids with each n ∈ Nj bidder auction equally
sharing the bids. For example, when we observe 1,200 bids for N2, then we
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Figure 21. Posterior of Misspecified Model
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Figure 22. *
Panel (a) shows the posterior of the valuation density by its pointwise mean and a 95%
credible band. Panel (b) is the posterior of the CRRA coefficients. Panel (c) summarizes
the posterior of the D-function. Panels (d) and (e) show the posterior of revenue functions
for n = 2 and n = 5 cases. On panels (a), (c), (d), and (e), the true quantities are the solid
line. (Panel (c) shows the identity.)
observe 400 bids for each of n ∈ {2, 4, 5} bidder auctions, i.e. we observe 200
two bidder auctions, 100 four bidder auctions, and 80 five bidder auctions. Since
we consider two N ’s and three sample sizes {600 bids, 1200 bids, 2400 bids}, we
have six pairs of N and sample sizes, for each of which we consider Correct
model, Redundant model, and Misspecified model. We run 18 experiments
in this subsection in addition to the 9 experiments with N1 in the previous
subsections.
Tables 5 and 7 document the results of the Monte Carlo study with N2 and
N3, respectively. In both cases, we observe the same pattern as we do in the case
of N1. The correct model and redundant model generate accurate estimates on
the model primitives and the Bayes action on reserve price produces essentially
maximum revenues. In addition, as sample size grows, the method becomes
AMBIGUITY IN FIRST PRICE AUCTION 37
Figure 23. Monte Carlo Study for Misspecified Model
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Figure 24. *
Panel (a) shows the sampling distribution of the estimated valuation densities by its
pointwise mean and a 95% frequency band. Panel (c) is the histogram of the CRRA
estimates. Panel (c) demonstrates the sampling distribution of the estimated D functions.
Panels (d) and (e) are for the estimated revenue functions with alternative numbers of
bidders. The solid lines represent the true quantities.
more accurate and precise, and the revenue loss decreases. On the other hand,
the misspecified model that ignores the ambiguity results in far less accurate
estimates on the model primitives and the revenue loss of about 3%.
5. Conclusion
We study first-price auction models where risk averse bidders have ambiguity
about the valuation distribution. In an environment where bidders consider
multiple distributions as equally reasonable and their preferences are repre-
sented by the maxmin expected utility, we characterize a symmetric and mono-
tonic equilibrium (bidding) strategy. We show that exogenous entry of bidders
is sufficient to identify model structure (true valuation distribution, the D-
function that measures the level of ambiguity and the risk aversion (CRRA)
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Table 5. Monte Carlo Study, N = {2, 4, 5}
Total N. MISE(f̂) MISE(D̂) MSE(θ̂u) Rev. Loss (%)
Specification of bids (A) (B) (C) n = 2 (D)
Correct 600 0.0075 0.0011 0.007 0.432
1200 0.0046 0.0007 0.005 0.315
2400 0.0033 0.0004 0.004 0.122
Redundant 600 0.0043 0.0004 0.006 0.148
1200 0.0024 0.0004 0.005 0.076
2400 0.0012 0.0003 0.003 0.045
Misspecified 600 0.0197 0.0128 0.078 2.900
1200 0.0208 0.0128 0.082 3.103
2400 0.0228 0.0128 0.084 3.261
Table 6. *
Columns (A) and (B) documents the MISEs of the valuation density estimate and the D
function estimate, respectively. Column (C) shows the MSE of the estimate for the CRRA
coefficient. Column (D) provides the revenue loss of the Bayes auction relative to the true
maximum revenue.
coefficient). To decide whether there is ambiguity in the data it is enough to
check if the D-function is strictly below an identity function.
Then we propose a flexible Bayesian estimation method that uses Bernstein
polynomials. Since the main objective of empirical auction is to use data to
design optimal auctions, we consider a multitude of simulation exercises to asses
the performance of our method and to analyze the importance of ambiguity
for the seller. We show that our method detects ambiguity correctly when
there is ambiguity, and when there is no ambiguity yet we allow for ambiguity,
there is no discernible loss to the seller from using our method. On the other
hand, if there is ambiguity and we ignore it, we show the estimates are biased
and as a result the seller can lose substantial (3% in our exercises) of revenue.
These exercises suggest that in empirical auction it is always better to allow
for ambiguity, unless the econometrician is absolutely certain that there is no
ambiguity among bidders.
We conclude by pointing out few avenues to explore for extension. First,
one could consider the possibility that entry is endogenous. With appropriate
exclusion restriction, as in Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003); Haile, Hong, and Shum
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Table 7. Monte Carlo Study, N = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
Total N. MISE(f̂) MISE(D̂) MSE(θ̂u) Rev. Loss (%)
Specification of bids (A) (B) (C) n = 2 (D)
Correct 600 0.0075 0.0013 0.009 0.596
1200 0.0042 0.0006 0.004 0.260
2400 0.0030 0.0004 0.003 0.084
Redundant 600 0.0040 0.0004 0.005 0.139
1200 0.0020 0.0004 0.004 0.058
2400 0.0010 0.0004 0.003 0.034
Misspecified 600 0.0180 0.0128 0.084 3.024
1200 0.0185 0.0128 0.091 3.299
2400 0.0208 0.0128 0.096 3.483
Table 8. *
Columns (A) and (B) documents the MISEs of the valuation density estimate and the D
function estimate, respectively. Column (C) shows the MSE of the estimate for the CRRA
coefficient. Column (D) provides the revenue loss of the Bayes auction relative to the true
maximum revenue.
(2006); Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), the model can still be identified. Sec-
ond, we can consider dynamic auctions with learning where bidders begin with
an exogenously specified set of distributions and update their beliefs after ev-
ery auction. It is well-known that the MEU model need not be dynamically
consistent with full Bayesian updating, see Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) and
Epstein and Schneider (2003); Epstein and Scheider (2007). Aryal and Stauber
(2014) showed that the method proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003) to
address dynamic inconsistency cannot be extended to games with multiple play-
ers. So it is not even clear how we can characterize equilibrium strategies.
Moreover, if bidders have incentive to learn then the seller might have incentive
to obfuscate by withholding the bids, simultaneously leading to the problem of
determining optimal disclosure rule, Bergemann and Wambach (2013) and the
informed principal problem Myerson (1983); Maskin and Tirole (1990).
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